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Foreword
Foreword
The recent growth of the startup scene and entrepreneurial community in St. Louis is incredibly exciting. it means economic progress for the St. Louis region and more jobs available for St. Louis citizens. Many 
newly formed local assets, such as itEn, t-rex, and Arch grants, are laying a 
foundation that will have impact for decades to come. 
in this paper, yas Motoyama from the Ewing Marion Kauffman foundation, 
and Karren watkins from washington university, document the resurgence 
of entrepreneurial activity in St. Louis by reporting on the collaboration and 
local learning within the startup community. this activity is happening both 
between entrepreneurs and between organizations that provide support, such 
as mentoring and funding, to entrepreneurs. As these connections deepen, the 
strength of the entrepreneurial ecosystem grows. 
Another finding from the research is that activity-based events, where 
entrepreneurs have the chance to use and practice the skills needed to grow 
their businesses, are most useful. St. Louis provides a multitude of these 
activities, such as Startup weekend, 1 Million Cups, Code until dawn, 
StartLouis, and globalhack. Some of these are St. Louis specific, but others 
have nationwide or global operations, providing important implications for 
other cities.
St. Louis is a unique city with its own history, people, and culture. yet, it 
shares many social and economic features with other cities across the nation. 
Although this paper’s focus is St. Louis, other cities can draw lessons from 
our experiences, and i hope this research sparks a dialogue about what 
entrepreneurship practices and policies they might consider and why. 
there is still much to learn, of course, as our entrepreneurial community is in its 
early stages, and there will undoubtedly be bumps along the way as we evolve. 
Because of this research, however, we will be able to do that growing in an 
informed, thoughtful way. 
Mayor francis g. Slay 
City of St. Louis
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executive Summary
 Recent research has shown that the job-creating 
potential of new, young and growing companies is 
vital to the U.S. economy. Other studies show that 
a community’s entrepreneur support network—the 
organizations and institutions that make up its 
“ecosystem”—is critical for new firms to succeed. 
What we do not know much about, however, is how to 
establish such an effective local ecosystem. 
 Traditional methods used to evaluate 
entrepreneurial ecosystems have focused on sizing up 
risk capital, incubators, a supportive culture, or other 
elements in an entrepreneurial community. We believe 
there is significant room for improvement by focusing 
instead on the relationships between these elements 
and the evolution of an ecosystem over time. 
 As a region seeks to successfully cultivate 
entrepreneurship, a keen understanding of how, when, 
or why different players interact with one another 
and how the ecosystem evolves is likely to make both 
public- and private-sector behavior more effective. 
Similarly, to identify potential policy implications, it is 
far more useful to analyze how successful ecosystems 
have developed over time—particularly how each 
got its start—than to attempt to copy a developed 
ecosystem. 
 This research is based on a case study of the 
startup ecosystem (a segment of an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem) in the St. Louis area. St. Louis was chosen 
because it has not been known as an entrepreneurial 
hub and because the recent, substantial transformation 
of its local entrepreneurship ecosystem provides greater 
implications for the evolution of the ecosystem.
Key connections
 We investigated four key connections within 
the ecosystem: connections between entrepreneurs; 
connections between formal support organizations; 
connections entrepreneurs have to key support 
organizations; and connections entrepreneurs have to 
other forms of support, such as to other entrepreneurs 
in the area, periodic entrepreneurship-oriented events, 
or other relevant organizations. Elements traditionally 
associated with entrepreneurship, such as incubators or 
venture capital firms, emerged only lightly in our study. 
Level 1: Connections Between Entrepreneurs
 Connections between entrepreneurs were 
extremely valuable and weighty. The 2013 Arch 
Grants recipients created a community for learning 
and support, constantly observing each other’s 
progress and providing feedback about each other’s 
businesses. These interactions consistently extended 
beyond the industrial sector. Another critical aspect 
was the connections between novice and experienced 
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs learned the most from 
other entrepreneurs and from mentors who had 
entrepreneurial experience. 
Level 2: Connections Between Support 
Organizations 
 Support organizations collaborated and 
coordinated to a high degree. Many connections 
between these organizations, such as shared board 
members, were strategic and functional, but there 
also were loose connections, including attending 
events organized by other organizations, serving on 
panels at those events, and jointly organizing events. 
Detailed back-stage discussions between the support 
organizations helped to avoid unintentional and 
unnecessary overlaps of support for specific companies. 
At the same time, the emergence of new support 
organizations, concerns over redundancies, and recent 
top leadership changes at support organizations 
all point to a constant reorganization of support 
organizations within a region, at least in this early stage 
of ecosystem development. This indicates that injecting 
“missing elements” of support is not sufficient to 
create a healthy ecosystem, but that the relationships 
between support elements matter the most. 
Level 3: Connections Between Entrepreneurs and 
Key Support Organizations
 We identified two types of support that 
organizations gave to startup companies: broad types, 
such as mentoring and connecting, and financial and 
functional types, such as business model assistance, 
pitch practice, and incubation. The most heterogeneous 
support was mentoring, which many support 
organizations identified as their primary service.
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 In observing universities functioning as sources 
of entrepreneurs, it was students or post-doctoral 
researchers, not professors or technology transfer 
offices, that commercialized university-based 
technologies. Of those interviewed, this happened 
exclusively with pharmaceutical or biotech firms. 
Level 4: Miscellaneous Support Connections
 Multiple entrepreneurs said there were several 
events they attended and found valuable. Many of 
these were open events organized by other support 
organizations, such as BioSTL, Lab1500, and Center 
for Emerging Technologies. The co-location of many 
grant recipients allowed support organizations to 
use these types of events as catalytic activities to 
connect entrepreneurs who might not otherwise meet. 
Moreover, we identified four other events, attended 
by multiple entrepreneurs, that were not run by formal 
organizations, but by groups of grassroots volunteers: 
Startup Weekend, Start Louis, Build Guild, and Code 
Until Dawn. 
implications
 Our research offers these lessons for those 
involved in local or regional startup ecosystems:
•	 Focus	on	connecting	entrepreneurs	to	
enhance learning between entrepreneurs. This 
can be done by injecting catalytic events.
•	 Communicate	and	collaborate	with	other	
entrepreneurial support organizations for 
constant readjustment of the local ecosystem.
•	 Cultivate	a	list	of	experienced	local	
entrepreneurs to connect them to nascent 
entrepreneurs. 
•	 Support	organizations	should	recruit	staff	
with entrepreneurial experience.
•	 If	a	public	venture	fund	has	already	been	
established, distribute smaller prizes to 
multiple startups, instead of one large prize, 
so that a group of entrepreneurs can become 
a cohort.
•	 If	incubators	already	exist,	reorganize	them	to	
connect entrepreneurs and enhance peer-
learning. Co-locate and integrate support 
organizations with incubators.
conclusion
 Cooperation between support organizations 
in the St. Louis area has undoubtedly played a key 
role in the evolution of this ecosystem by connecting 
entrepreneurs with the types of support they need, 
when they need it. One of the most critical support 
types was other entrepreneurs with specific expertise or 
experience. 
 We saw that Arch Grants played a large role in 
creating a community of entrepreneurs. It did this by 
dispersing multiple small grants, which established 
large cohorts of entrepreneurs, as many as twenty per 
group; carefully streaming its efforts to integrate with 
local entrepreneurship assets, such as encouraging 
its recipients to co-locate in specific locations, which 
further enhanced the interaction between them; and 
connecting them to local key support organizations, 
such as ITEN, BioGenerator, and others. As of July 
2014, one year after the award, the twenty recipients 
have created 104 jobs, generated more than $2.8 
million in revenue, and raised more than $17 million in 
investment (See Appendix 2). 
 Because our study is an exploratory and descriptive 
project, we cannot yet tell how well the companies will 
thrive and the startup ecosystem will evolve. However, 
we hope that this research informs other communities 
of how to build a strong entrepreneurial ecosystem and 
conduct research to gauge success.
executive Summary  |   introduction
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1. introduction
 We have known that entrepreneurship plays 
crucial roles in economic development. More than 
a century ago, Schumpeter (Schumpeter 1912) 
theoretically uncovered the role of entrepreneurs 
in the famous process of “creative destruction,” 
or innovations. More recent empirical works have 
demonstrated that startup and young firms (five years 
old or younger) generate virtually all net jobs in the 
United States (Haltiwanger 2012; Haltiwanger, Jarmin, 
and Miranda 2013).
 We also have known that entrepreneurship is 
largely	a	local	phenomenon	(Malecki	1994;	Feldman	
2003). It is well known that Silicon Valley possesses 
a unique structure and culture that distinguishingly 
produces corporate and university spin-offs and 
networks through which entrepreneurs themselves 
and venture capitalists interact (Saxenian 1994; 
Kenney 2000; Lecuyer 2006). Similarly, nationwide 
empirical investigation has revealed that rates of 
entrepreneurship vary substantially by metropolitan 
regions (Acs and Armington 2006).
 Nonetheless, we have limited knowledge about 
the local system of entrepreneurship. While classic 
urban development theories (Marshall 1898; Castells 
1989) and the cluster theory (Porter 1994, 1998) 
touched some on the notion of entrepreneurship, they 
treated entrepreneurship as one of the peripheral, 
externality factors with some high or low rates at 
certain locations, but provided no analysis about the 
structure, network, or composition of local systems 
of entrepreneurship. The same limitation applies to 
innovation studies, such as the regional innovation 
systems (Cooke 1998; Cooke and Morgan 1998; 
Lundvall 1992) and the Triple Helix model (Etzkowitz 
and Dzisah 2008; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000).
 We were able to identify only a handful of studies 
directly discussing this subject of the entrepreneurship 
“ecosystem,” and we consider this a critical omission. 
Moreover, the limited past studies on this subject 
tended to focus on identifying a broad list of elements 
in the ecosystem, but lacked any analysis on the 
connections between those elements. In our view, it 
is more important to analyze how and how well those 
elements are connected than what those elements are. 
In this article, we conduct a ground-level observation of 
specific actors and organizations in order to understand 
the connections more concretely. We provide a more 
parsimonious model of entrepreneurship ecosystem 
with rich context about the connections between 
the elements of the ecosystem, particularly between 
entrepreneurs and key support organizations.
2. Literature review
 The local system of entrepreneurship is an 
understudied subject, and we could identify only a 
handful of related studies, unlike plentiful studies of 
industrial clusters or systems of innovations. According 
to Van de Ven (Van de Ven 1993), the lack of research 
on this subject came from the exclusive focus by 
earlier academic studies of entrepreneurship on 
individual characteristics and behaviors of individual 
entrepreneurs. In other words, the past studies tended 
to ask who the entrepreneurs are and what kind of 
individual traits lead them to success.
 In contrast, Van de Ven advanced the concept of 
the “social system framework” by identifying actors 
broadly engaged in innovations and entrepreneurship 
at the local scale, such as a university and its scientific 
research, financing and insurance arrangements, and 
the human competence pool.
Successful ecosystems are, by definition, highly developed. It would be 
much more useful if we could answer how those successful ecosystems have 
developed over time and, particularly, how each ecosystem started.
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 Subsequently, Neck and his colleagues (Neck et 
al. 2004; Cohen 2006) cultivated the framework with 
observation based on Boulder, Colorado, and identified 
six elements: incubators, spin-off firms, formal and 
informal networks, physical infrastructure, and culture. 
Similarly,	Feldman	(Feldman	2001)	uncovered	that	
pioneering entrepreneurs, supportive social capital, 
venture capital, entrepreneurial support services, 
and engaged research universities contributed to the 
successful establishment of an entrepreneurial culture 
in the Washington, D.C., area. 
 Reviewing these past works leads us to identify 
three	major	limitations.	First,	the	past	studies	focused	
on identifying elements of a system and hardly 
analyzed the connections between them. We do 
not argue that the past works ignored the aspect 
of connections. Indeed, they often stressed the 
importance of ‘networks’ as one of the elements, 
but we think it was insufficient. There is a wide 
range in networks: formal networks with organized 
associations may fit better as an element in the 
framework, while informal networks—the state 
of two or more individuals being connected—are 
more difficult to conceptualize. Treating them as one 
generalized group will cause enormous ambiguity 
about how each element can be defined or acts, and 
how different elements interact. Comparably, social 
capital is an extremely broad concept. It can mean 
the presence of specific actors or the state of having 
high-level interactions between them. Culture is 
an even broader concept. One can provide a highly 
generalized definition and a few examples, but it does 
not help to disentangle the system, its elements, and its 
interactions.
 Such examination of interconnectedness is 
enormously challenging, and the blame should not 
fall onto these past studies on entrepreneurship 
ecosystem alone. Many regional development theories, 
which study both actors (individuals and firms) and 
aggregated units (communities and industries), have 
long struggled to conceptualize and examine those 
externality aspects.
 The second major limitation of the past works 
is their tendency toward a holistic framework, which 
often ended up with an inclusive approach to any 
possible elements. It is easy to imagine that, under 
the social system framework, there can be many 
elements involved, if only tangentially. We already 
listed the common ones: venture capital, specialized 
entrepreneurship support organizations, research 
universities, incubators, and a pool of skilled labor. 
What is missing is a critical examination of which 
elements are essential actors. Such insight can provide 
more concrete implications for how to establish or 
promote the local ecosystem from a policy perspective.
 Popular media followed more or less on the 
inclusive	and	element-focused	approach.	For	instance,	
the Financial Times (Moules 2014) reported that 
Kansas City, Missouri, could reach its full potential 
by enhancing connections with large corporations 
and universities, attracting venture capital money, 
establishing an international airport, and celebrating 
local heroes. Similarly, Forbes (Cohn 2013) argued 
that the assets of the St. Louis, Missouri, ecosystem 
came from local universities, local venture capital firms, 
wealthy angels, support organizations, and the pool 
of talent. In general, the media’s approach is either to 
pose naïve optimism by listing the general elements 
a region possesses, or to call for a policy action by 
pointing out the missing element(s). Lack of finance 
and talent are the most hotly debated topics.
 In contrast, a few selective practitioner-based 
studies have challenged the necessity of certain 
elements that conventionally were believed to 
be	elements	of	the	ecosystem.	Feld,	a	successful	
entrepreneur, mentor, and investor, openly asserted 
that the university research function did not contribute 
to the vibrant startup community in Boulder, Colorado 
(Feld	2012),	a	region	identified	as	having	a	high	
level of startups by many measures, including the 
Business Dynamics Statistics of Census (Konczal 2013) 
and the list of high-growth Inc. firms (Motoyama 
and Danley 2012). Instead, University of Colorado-
Boulder indirectly helped the community by opening 
up its lecture halls for large local entrepreneur and 
supporter meetings. Chapman (Chapman 2011) not 
only agreed about the research university role, but 
also found that the sheer volume of investment means 
little about the vibrancy of the startup community, but 
introduction  |   Literature review
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that the connectivity between investors and investees, 
transparency, liquidity, and governance of finance are 
the keys for regional success.
 Those practitioner-based studies provided further 
insights.	Most	notably,	Feld	(Feld	2012)	presented	
four postulates of a vibrant startup community: 
1) Entrepreneurs, not professors, policymakers, or 
agency administrators, must lead the entrepreneurial 
community. 2) The community must have a 
porous boundary by including the entire stack of 
entrepreneurs, from experienced serial entrepreneurs 
to nascent entrepreneurs. 3) The community must 
have organized activities that engage people in the 
entrepreneurial context. No cocktail parties and 
networking receptions. 4) Community leaders must 
commit for the long term, at least twenty years. 
Hwang and Horowitt (Hwang and Horowitt 2012) 
similarly stressed the importance of openness in the 
Silicon Valley ecosystem and additionally argued that 
recipe matters more than ingredients. While Isenberg 
(Isenberg 2013) explicitly listed the six elements, he also 
emphasized the importance of ‘high-order interactions’ 
and self-sustainability of the ecosystem. These findings 
contribute to describing the general characteristics of 
the ecosystem that past academic studies have little 
investigated. Moreover, their challenges of the need for 
certain elements of a system indicate a gap between 
academic and practitioner findings and the need for 
more critical examination.
 The third and related limitation of past studies 
is their lack of power to analyze the evolution of 
ecosystems. It is natural to study the ecosystem 
of visibly successful regions, such as Silicon Valley 
(Saxenian	1994;	Lecuyer	2006)	and	Boulder	(Feld	
2012). However, those successful ecosystems are, by 
definition,	highly	developed.	For	policy	implications,	it	
would be much more useful if we could answer how 
those successful ecosystems have developed over time 
and, particularly, how each ecosystem started. This 
presents enormous challenges for scholars, as we have 
to trace the history of a region for easily a few decades. 
Feld	(Feld	2012)	admitted	that	much	of	the	foundation	
of Boulder’s startup community was built more than 
twenty years ago, before he arrived there.
	 In	this	evolutionary	perspective,	Feldman	(Feldman	
2001) was the pioneer to analyze how Washington, 
D.C.’s ecosystem has emerged since the 1980s. 
However, she induced four elements from the past 
literature—finance, supportive social capital, support 
services, and research university (p. 863)—not based on 
a critical analysis of whether each element was crucial 
for Washington’s ecosystem. Moreover, she analyzed 
the evolution of each element separately and did not 
investigate the connections between them.
 Intentionally or unintentionally, the three 
limitations of the entrepreneurship ecosystem 
literature we raised here apply equally to the cluster 
theory, a study that holistically summarized industrial 
agglomerations. Indeed, both the ecosystem and 
cluster theories identified essentially the same 
elements. Porter (Porter 1994, 2000) listed risk capital 
(such as venture capitals), specialized support services, 
research universities and corporate research labs, core 
customers, and a labor force. His stylized diagram of 
the wine industry in California (Porter 1998) showed 
some loose configuration of related subsectors, but 
fell short of explaining how, exactly, and how much, 
those actors are connected. Despite Porter’s insistence 
on the importance of interconnectedness and dynamic 
evolution, the cluster theory has not yet provided 
sufficient explanation of either (Motoyama 2008). 
So far, the entrepreneurship ecosystem literature has 
followed the same trajectory.
3. Situating the caSe 
oF St. LouiS
 In the previous section, we identified the  
three major limitations of the past academic studies 
about the entrepreneurship ecosystem: the focus on 
elements without much attention on connections 
between them, the holistic and inclusive approach that 
came up with essentially the same list of elements as 
the general industrial cluster theory, and the lack of 
evolutionary analysis.
 In this article, we propose a different approach 
to	overcome	those	three	limitations.	First,	we	focus	
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on describing the connections between elements of a 
system. While geographic studies have an advantage 
in holistically capturing phenomenon in a given 
region, their primary observation on aggregated units, 
such as industries, a labor pool, and some undefined 
collection of firms in the similar industrial activity, as 
well as their competition and collaboration, is not 
suited to analyze the connection between elements. A 
connection, by definition, is an action between specific 
actors. Thus, we need to focus on analyzing specific 
actors, individuals and specific organizations, instead of 
aggregated ones.
 Second, we find that discussing which element 
can be included in the ecosystem is little productive. 
Once you start this debate, it is likely to end up with a 
broadly inclusive list, because researchers do not want 
to be criticized for missing any element that may be 
included.	Furthermore,	it	gives	the	impression	that	
the broader inclusion provides a more comprehensive 
theory and system. Thus, the question should be about 
what the system’s most critical elements are, how (and 
how well) they are or are not connected, and how  
they evolve. 
 Third, the holistic approach implies the 
homogeneity of ecosystems. In other words, the past 
studies assumed that, whatever the different local, 
industrial, and entrepreneurial structures are, the 
entrepreneurship ecosystems in different regions should 
look alike in the theory. In contrast, we start with an 
assumption of heterogeneity. Different regions can 
have different ecosystem structures. Thus, in this paper, 
we take a minimalist approach and start with the 
two most essential elements of the entrepreneurship 
ecosystem: entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship 
support organizations. Here, we emphasize support 
organizations that directly focus on entrepreneurship, 
and do not necessarily include general economic 
development agencies. We analyze the interactions 
between entrepreneurs themselves and between 
entrepreneurs and support organizations. Subsequently, 
we analyze what other actors and organizations are 
involved in the process of entrepreneurship. In sum, we 
use a highly exploratory and descriptive approach by 
minimizing the normative debate of what the system 
should look like.
	 Fourth,	we	focus	on	the	startup	ecosystem,	
a segment of the entrepreneurship ecosystem. 
Due to the understudied nature of the subject, 
we should not assume the existence of a holistic 
entrepreneurship ecosystem. Here, we find that 
investigating entrepreneurship is challenging because 
there are different types of entrepreneurship, from 
mom-and-pop shops and lifestyle consultants to 
highly scalable companies with or without technology-
intensive products. Additionally, the ecosystem 
of startup entrepreneurship, i.e., very early-stage 
entrepreneurship, may be contextually different from 
the ecosystem of high-growth entrepreneurship, 
in which existing companies with a certain scale of 
revenue are trying to expand rapidly. We will explain 
our focus on the startup ecosystem in detail shortly.
	 Fifth,	we	investigate	a	region	that	has	not	been	
known as a hub of entrepreneurship, but has been 
undergoing a substantial transformation within its 
local entrepreneurship ecosystem: St. Louis, Missouri. 
Our ground-level observation has indicated that 
the landscape of entrepreneurship has changed 
substantially in the past few years (Duttia, interview, 
August 24, 2012; Harrington, interview, December 10, 
2012), and the similar observation was reported by a 
detailed journalistic report (Reilly 2014). The macro-
level data of Business Dynamics Statistics additionally 
demonstrates a sharp recovery of startup creation in 
2010 and 2011, much higher than the national rate. 
While we cannot prove that this changing landscape 
of entrepreneurship in St. Louis will sustain and 
fully develop, we believe there is a good amount of 
The question should be about what the system’s most critical elements are, 
how (and how well) they are or are not connected, and how they evolve.
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evidence to indicate the evolution of this region’s 
ecosystem.
about the St. Louis region
 We begin by providing brief information about 
the region. Throughout the last half century, St. Louis 
largely has been known as a “big business” city, home 
to many stable national and global corporations. 
Anheuser-Busch, Nestlé Purina Petcare, Emerson 
Electric, Enterprise Rent-A-Car, and A.G. Edwards 
are just a few of these. The 1990s, however, saw the 
cumulative effects of many years of economic decline. 
For	instance,	Southwestern	Bell	Communications	(now	
AT&T) relocated its headquarters from St. Louis to San 
Antonio, Texas, in 1993 (St. James Press, 2000); the 
Great	Flood	of	1993	devastated	the	region	(Larson,	
1996); McDonnell Douglas was purchased by Boeing 
in 1996 (Knowlton 1996); and, later, Anheuser-Busch 
was purchased by the Belgian-Brazilian company InBev 
in 2008 (De la Merced 2008). The restructurings by 
so-called ‘anchor firms’ led the region to undergo 
significant economic changes, particularly reflected in 
a reduction in manufacturing jobs, downsizing and 
acquisition of major corporations, decline and then 
gentrification of the urban metro area. Combined with 
the nationwide economic downturn of 2008, the late 
2000s saw St. Louis as a city with a surplus of skilled, 
unemployed workers and a need for new engines of 
economic development.
 Both the public and private sectors invested 
enormous effort in reinventing the region, including 
the state economic development agency, the Greater 
St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, local universities, and 
prominent community figures such as John McDonnell 
and Bill Danforth. Two prominent reinvention 
strategies emerged by 2010: the Mosaic Project to 
attract immigrants to the area, and the promotion of 
entrepreneurship. In addition, Washington University 
in St. Louis’s Skandalaris Center for Entrepreneurship, 
founded in 2003 through a Ewing Marion Kauffman 
Foundation	grant,	became	progressively	more	involved	
with the community, and many new entrepreneurship 
support organizations have launched since 2011 (see 
Table 1).
 One such support was the creation of Arch Grants, 
a nonprofit corporation founded in 2011 by Joe 
Schlafly, a venture capitalist and proponent of St. Louis 
economic development, and Jerry Schlichter, a lawyer 
invested in the region’s success. Arch Grants’ goals 
are to make St. Louis an attractive place for startup 
businesses to launch and to increase employment 
growth in the city. To achieve these goals, Arch Grants 
holds an annual business plan competition that 
awards a package of prizes to each of twenty winners. 
Arch Grants seeks companies that are early-stage, 
scalable, and have disruptive, unique ideas, and each 
recipient receives $50,000 in equity-free cash. In 
return, companies who accept the Arch Grants award 
must agree to locate their business in St. Louis for the 
following year.1  Startups from any sector may apply.
 It is worth noting that public-sector interventions 
have not been effectively conceived in past evaluation 
studies, particularly studies about incubators (Amezcua 
2010) and public venture funds (Lerner 2009). We 
do not assume that a company receiving Arch Grants 
funding necessarily denotes an entrepreneurial success. 
It only confirms that a firm was able to launch its 
business with a modest amount of cash awarded by a 
semi-public entity. However, tracing the Arch Grants 
recipients provides us a framework to capture a group 
of startup firms in the region, and it is suitable for our 
focus	on	the	startup	ecosystem.	Furthermore,	all	these	
collective efforts by the public, semi-public, and private 
sectors demonstrate a case that can produce direct 
policy implications.
1. Arch Grants does allow a few recipients to locate outside of the downtown St. Louis area. A startup may be granted this exclusion if the 
“nature of their business precludes them from” locating downtown, in which case the business must receive permission to locate elsewhere 
in the St. Louis region (Arch Grants 2014a).
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Organization Target Industry Founded
Center for Entrepreneurship (St. Louis univ.) All 1987
Skandalaris Center for Entrepreneurial Studies (washington univ. in St. Louis) All 2001
CortEx Life sciences 2002
Biogenerator Life sciences 2003
innoVAtE/VMS2 All 2007
it Enterprises (univ. of Missouri, St. Louis) Life sciences, it 2008
itEn it 2008
BioStL Life sciences 2011
t-rEx it 2011
Capital innovators All 2011
helix Center Biotech 2012
Lab1500 All 2012
StLVentureworks All 2012
Arch grants All 2012
1 Million Cups All 2013
table 1. entrepreneurship Support organizations in St. Louis
 The twenty 2013 Arch Grants recipients were from 
various sectors, with products and services ranging 
from women’s triathlon apparel to mobile advertising 
solutions.	For	purposes	of	this	report,	we	anonymized	
startups according their sector. We classified eight 
companies as “Biotech,” another eight companies 
as “IT/Information Services,” and the remaining four 
as “Other”—which are either manufacturing- or 
education-focused.
 We started to interview these Arch Grants 
recipients in late 2013 and were able to reach sixteen 
out of twenty. Incidentally, the four companies we 
could not interview or that declined to be interviewed 
were located outside the St. Louis region. Then, we 
expanded our interviews to key support organizations 
mentioned by the sixteen startup companies.
4. anaLySiS
 Our core analysis is to observe the connections 
between entrepreneurs and other key players in the 
region. This analysis led us to identify the connections 
within the ecosystem at four levels. 
Situating the caSe oF St. LouiS  |   anaLySiS
2. Currently Gateway VMS.
1 0    |   E x A M i n i n g  t h E  C o n n E C t i o n S  w i t h i n  t h E  S t A r t u p  E C o S y S t E M :  A  C A S E  S t u d y  o f  S t .  L o u i S
Level 1: connections Between 
entrepreneurs
 The first level is the connections between 
entrepreneurs. About two-thirds of Arch Grants 
recipients have reported periodic interactions with 
other	Arch	Grants	recipients,	and	Figure	1	visualizes	the	
relationships.
 This does not necessarily mean that all of the 
companies developed dense relationships with 
each other. Of the sixteen recipient companies we 
interviewed, twelve mentioned active relationships, 
while the four others did not mention any specific 
ties to other entrepreneurs. A few of the twelve 
companies were more active and expressed four or 
3.	We	interviewed	sixteen	companies,	but	show	eighteen	in	Figure	1	because	two	non-interviewed	companies	were	mentioned	by	our	
interviewed companies. We omit two other companies because we cannot assess whether they are truly disconnected from the others.
 Figure 1. connections between arch grants recipients3
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more connections to other companies, while most 
other companies expressed at least two connections. 
As coloring shows different sectors, the figure also 
demonstrates that biotech firms (shown in gray) had 
connections with other biotech firms, and IT firms 
(shown in light green) had connections with other  
IT firms.
 These relationships suggest that Arch Grants’ 
method of distributing the award to twenty companies 
created a recipient community in which those recipients 
constantly observed the progress of the other recipient 
companies and provided each other feedback about 
their businesses. Such a sense of community was 
expressed in multiple interviews through comments 
such as: “He [a founder of another Arch Grants 
recipient company] is a nice guy and he’s really 
intelligent. He gives me a lot of advice, but I know 
I also bother him. But all of us grant recipients are 
friends,	and	it’s	like	a	fraternity	or	sorority”	(Other	Firm	
A). “It’s a great environment. I had some questions 
about some of the frameworks that they [another 
recipient company] are using, and sometimes other 
people stop by and ask me things: what do you think 
about	this	idea?”	(IT	Firm	A).	The	same	entrepreneur	
provided a further example: “This guy came [by] 
yesterday and he almost pulled my ears. He said, 
‘You’re going to need more customers. You have 
enough traffic and people that are engaged with you. 
Now you should put time on selling this.’ I said, ‘OK, 
let’s have a second conversation and see what you’re 
doing on your side because you need more traffic.’”
 One biotech firm characterized the interaction 
with another biotech firm as follows: “What we 
wanted to do as the Arch Grants recipients and being 
in [the] life science space is that we wanted to get 
together and start working on these [government] 
grants [such as SBIR and STTR] ourselves. So, I’ll get 
feedback from them on my grant and give feedback 
to	them”	(Biotech	Firm	A).	The	varied	industrial	sectors	
represented among the Arch Grants recipients did not 
seem to matter, and the interaction extended beyond 
those sectors. “You’re doing completely different 
things. You’re all building something and that involves 
kind of the same thought process, I like to think. 
Different expertise, but definitely the same thought 
process”	(Biotech	Firm	B).	These	interactions	created	an	
environment in which they not only could learn from 
their peers, but also support each other emotionally 
through the rough and uncertain journey they, as 
entrepreneurs, were facing.
 These interactions the entrepreneurs described 
quickly led us to the second and third levels of 
interactions by including key entrepreneurship support 
organizations in the region. 
Level 2: connections Between 
Support organizations 
 The second level of connections is between the 
support organizations. Here, the connections we 
identified were not “some informal relationships,” 
but	strategic	and	functional	ones.	For	instance,	three	
support organizations had a monthly brownbag lunch 
to exchange information: ITEN, a support organization 
for information technology startups; BioGenerator, the 
similar one for biotech and pharmaceutical startups; 
and STL VentureWorks, a support organization that 
provides incubation space. This coordinated relationship 
was reflected in crossover relationships with their board 
These interactions created an environment in which they not only could 
learn from their peers, but also support each other emotionally through the 
rough and uncertain journey they, as entrepreneurs, were facing.
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members, such as those among STL VentureWorks, 
Cultivation	Capital,	and	ITEN.	Furthermore,	the	
executive director of InnovateVMS, a mentoring service 
provider, previously worked at the Skandalaris Center at 
Washington University in St. Louis under a major grant 
initiative	from	the	Kauffman	Foundation.	Thus,	these	
two organizations naturally collaborated and shared 
networks of mentors. Moreover, two founders of 
Capital Innovators, an accelerator program, served as 
mentors of companies supported by ITEN. Other loose 
connections included attending events organized by 
other organizations, serving on a panel at those events, 
and jointly organizing events. These relationships are 
visualized	in	Figure	2.
Level 3: connections Between 
entrepreneurs and Key Support 
organizations
 The third level of interaction is the connections 
between the Arch Grants recipient companies and 
support	organizations.	Figure	3	gives	a	fuller	picture	of	
dense relationships between these actors.
CapInno
1MC ITEN Skand
STL VW IVMS
BioGen
Figure 2. connections between support organizations
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	 While	Figure	1	(representing	only	company	
connections) showed five companies that were not 
connected	to	other	companies,	Figure	3	demonstrates	
that all five were not isolated, but had connections 
through at least one, and sometimes more, support 
organizations.
 Perhaps more importantly, detailed information 
from the interviews can identify multiple layers of 
support provided by different supporting organizations. 
IT	Firm	C	described	its	development	process	and	the	
support it received as follows:
“We were then based in Chicago. [Another 
entrepreneur in St. Louis] set a date and 
introduced us not only to Capital Innovators 
[an accelerator], but also Arch Grants and 
even to Cultivation Capital [a venture capital 
firm]. […]
“At the demo day of the Capital Innovators, 
[an angel investor] approached us and said 
he’s interested in investing. That helps us 
bridge between Capital Innovators and Arch 
Grants, because we didn’t get the money 
Eateria
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Figure 3. connections between arch grants recipients and support organizations
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from Arch Grants until July 1. It also gave us a 
bargaining chip with Cultivation Capital. […]
“Probably our biggest mentor to date has 
been Brian Matthews, who was our lead 
advisor and mentor for Capital Innovator, and 
he’s also a principal at Cultivation Capital. […]
“We hired two students from [Washington 
University in St. Louis]. The Skandalaris Center 
has already done matching students with 
companies with résumés ready.”
 These remarks show that financial support from 
Arch Grants, an accelerator, and a venture capital did 
not occur in isolation, but rather that the connections 
between different organizations led to financing of the 
company in stages.
	 Other	Firm	B	expressed	that	the	company’s	genesis	
was	at	the	Missouri	Venture	Forum,	a	monthly	meeting	
attended by 100 investors, entrepreneurs, service 
providers, and job seekers. One founder presented 
an idea during the two-minute forum, the other 
founder liked the idea, and they wrote the business 
plan together. The two periodically attended meetings 
organized by ITEN, 1 Million Cups (1MC), and the 
Skandalaris Center, and one served as a judge for the 
Skandalaris business plan competition. Lastly, this firm 
also received mentoring services from Innovate VMS.
Other	Firm	C	mentioned	that	“the	Arch	Grants	got	us	
to ITEN, which got us to a business journal, which put 
us in touch with some of our client contacts. ITEN is a 
validity thing. They got us into the Startup Connection 
at the Science Center, where we won people’s choice  
[. . .] Then, ITEN put us in touch with Capital 
Innovators, which gives us practice in just pitching  
and selling, which is really valuable practice.”
 Thus, the connections between support 
organizations were not simple interpersonal 
connections in which directors of different 
organizations knew each other. Rather, the fact that 
the company received support or completed a program 
through a support organization functioned as an 
accomplishment and a validation. Interviews with 
those support organizations further revealed that the 
organizations’ directors exchanged highly detailed 
information about specific companies, such as the 
company’s stage, strengths and weaknesses, and what 
it has done in the past, including what did and didn’t 
work (Interview, Brasunas, August 1, 2013; interview, 
Chmelir, August 1, 2013). These periodic conversations 
between support organizations helped to avoid 
unintentional and unnecessary overlaps of support. At 
the same time, some support and training took place 
continuously through different support organizations; 
for instance, reformulation of business model and 
expansion of customer base were not one-time 
processes, but required continual training that evolved 
over time.
Level 4: miscellaneous Support 
connections
 The last and fourth level of connections we 
observed was those that went beyond entrepreneurs 
and support organizations to include other 
miscellaneous actors. These connections include other 
entrepreneurs in the area, periodic entrepreneurship-
oriented events, and other miscellaneous organizations. 
To begin with, the connections between entrepreneurs 
extended beyond the cohort of Arch Grants recipients. 
The Arch Grants awarded fifteen companies in 2012, 
in addition to twenty in 2013, and several of the 
2012 cohort interacted heavily with members of 
the	2013	cohort.	For	instance,	IT	Firm	B	expressed	
that it frequently interacted with the three IT firm 
recipients	from	the	2012	cohort.	Manufacturing	Firm	
A mentioned that founders of two companies from 
the 2012 cohort served as mentors. Additionally, one 
founder in the 2012 cohort served as a mentor for two 
companies in the 2013 cohort. Therefore, the peer 
learning effect was not strictly within each cohort. With 
entrepreneurship, one year could make a difference in 
terms of the learning curve and business development. 
Senior and experienced entrepreneurs were not 
the only formal mentors, but rather, the mixture of 
senior and peer interactions evolved into informal 
mentorships.
 To keep relative simplicity in the network map, 
Figure	4	depicts	the	fourth-level	connections	mentioned	
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by at least two firms in the 2013 cohort of Arch Grants 
recipients. To distinguish from earlier figures, the newly 
identified actors are represented in orange.
 Interviews further revealed mentorship 
relationships with four local mentors with previous 
entrepreneurial experience who actively served as 
mentors for six Arch Grants recipient companies. We 
could not identify any specific patterns of how the 
entrepreneurs found those mentors: it could be by 
attending one of entrepreneurial events to be discussed 
below, by an introduction by support organizations, or 
by a referral from completely different acquaintances. 
However, the presence of four local mentors commonly 
serving multiple Arch Grants recipients indicates that, 
while the ways startup and experienced entrepreneurs 
met may seem random, the experienced mentors had 
specific network “circles.” Once startup entrepreneurs 
got into the circles, they were able to build 
relationships with mentors relatively quickly—within 
a matter of months. These mentors were experienced 
entrepreneurs who were highly active and supportive 
of startups, and all interviewees mentioned that they 
CapInno
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Immunophotonics
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Figure 4. extended connections between arch grants recipients, support 
organizations, and other supporters
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were generous, voluntary mentors willing to give back 
to the next generation of entrepreneurs.
 In addition to the mentor relationships, multiple 
entrepreneurs mentioned seven entrepreneurial events 
as valuable. These were open events organized by 
other entrepreneurship support organizations, such 
as BioSTL, Lab 1500, and the Center for Emerging 
Technologies. Moreover, we identified four other 
important events that were not run by these kinds 
of formal organizations, but by groups of grassroots 
volunteers: Startup Weekend, Start Louis, Build Guild, 
and Code Until Dawn.4  Table 2 provides a brief 
explanation of each event.
	 Five	out	of	six	biotech	firms	mentioned	
connections with local or regional universities: 
University of Missouri at Columbia (Mizzou), University 
of Missouri at St. Louis, and the Washington University 
School of Medicine. The common pattern we observe 
is that the founders were graduate students or post-
doctoral researchers at each campus who then started 
companies based on technologies and expertise in 
which they were trained. In other words, entrepreneurs 
did not reach universities to seek technologies 
for commercialization, nor did entrepreneurs 
and professors work together on technology 
commercialization. The role of professors, rather, 
was restricted either to introducing other academic 
researchers in the related technological or scientific 
fields, who were not necessarily based in St. Louis, or 
to serving on companies’ advisory boards. Note that 
serving on a company’s advisory board was completely 
different from involvement in operating a company or 
service as a business mentor, as mentioned previously, 
but usually limited to advice on specific scientific and 
technological matters. 
 Two other miscellaneous institutions are worth 
mentioning. While we did not identify involvement by 
traditional economic development agencies, Missouri 
Technology Corporation (MTC) was one exception. 
MTC is a semi-public state organization that aims to 
promote new and high-tech companies (MTC 2013). 
Three companies indicated using MTC’s Venture Capital 
Co-Investment Program, so, in that sense, MTC’s 
involvement was indirect. Investment decisions were 
made by local accelerators or venture capitals, and they 
additionally pulled resources from MTC.
 Lastly, two interviewees mentioned the St. Louis 
Business Journal. In both cases, the local media also 
provided validation, as being mentioned in an article or 
event name description
Startup weekend
A weekend activity in which instant teams work on business plans and present by  
Sunday afternoon
Start Louis
A monthly meetup of solo entrepreneurs and startup enthusiasts for learning and 
collaboration
Build guild A monthly meetup of web professionals
Code until dawn A monthly all-night coding event
table 2. St. Louis events attended by multiple entrepreneurs
4.	These	events	are	not	represented	as	large	dots	in	Figure	4,	but	do	not	undermine	the	importance	of	those	events	in	the	ecosystem.	Our	
point here is that a collection of these events has substantially increased the connections, in addition to what the support organizations and 
other groups have provided.
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receiving an award like “30 under 30” opened doors to 
new customers or other valuable business connections.
5. diScuSSion
 The startup ecosystem and its structure, based 
on our ground-level observation, appeared to be 
substantially different from what was identified by 
past academic studies. Virtually no studies empirically 
investigated the connections between entrepreneurs, 
which was one of, or perhaps the most, important 
aspects of our observation, at least as perceived by 
entrepreneurs. At best, the past studies could talk 
about the critical mass of entrepreneurs, but that 
literally referred to the sheer quantitative size. What 
matters more for entrepreneurs is the density within 
the	mass	of	entrepreneurs.	While	Feldman	(Feldman	
2001) came closest to pointing out the presence of 
pioneering entrepreneurs, our research goes deeper 
on	this	aspect.	First,	it	was	not	just	the	presence	of	
pioneering entrepreneurs, but the mixture of nascent 
and experienced (pioneering) entrepreneurs that had 
significance. Second, the interaction between those 
two groups of entrepreneurs was even more important. 
Entrepreneurs learn from other entrepreneurs, and 
from mentors who have entrepreneurial experience. 
The interaction we observed repeatedly reflected the 
learning taking place between individuals.
	 Furthermore,	this	learning	process	was	not	exactly	
knowledge acquired through educational training 
from universities, but practical knowledge acquired 
through personal interactions and experimentally 
applied to a tailored case that each entrepreneur was 
facing at the moment. In that sense, the peers could 
provide feedback because they were facing similar 
problems, and the experienced mentors also could 
provide feedback because they had encountered similar 
problems before.
 To infer from our observation, the common 
elements of the startup ecosystem were rather 
parsimonious: entrepreneurs, support organizations 
focusing on entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial events, 
and universities. 
 As mentioned before, this research is highly 
exploratory and, hence, inductive. We therefore 
have no intention of defining the entrepreneurship 
ecosystem deductively. Instead, what we induce 
from our observation is that the startup ecosystem 
required some critical mass of entrepreneurs, and 
that the interconnections between them helped them 
learn from each other and to innovate within their 
businesses. Several key support organizations, including 
Arch Grants, entrepreneurship-oriented events, and 
the flows of people between local research universities 
and startups helped to catalyze those interconnections 
between people and organizations.
 Many past economic geography studies have 
used broad terms, such as culture (Neck et al. 2004; 
Cohen	2006)	or	social	capital	(Feldman	2001),	in	the	
ecosystem. These are tempting concepts to express 
some fuzzy phenomenon or relationship between 
people and organizations. Yet, they are such broad 
terms that they have little power to deconstruct the 
structure or process toward identifying meaningful 
implications. Embracing ‘risk-taking culture’ is indeed 
important; however, such perceptions do not exist in 
a vacuum, but will emerge from specific role models, 
processes, and networks. Mentorship between 
experienced and nascent entrepreneurs transcends 
The startup ecosystem and its structure, based on our ground-level 
observation, appeared to be substantially different from what was 
identified by past academic studies.
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the role models, and the connections between those 
entrepreneurs form the processes and networks.
 We believe that our research has deepened 
understanding of this ‘cultural’ aspect. Attitudes 
toward risk-taking can be perpetuated through 
the ecosystem because entrepreneurs shared their 
experiences, which were by definition risk-taking. Then, 
entrepreneurs could comment on others’ activities, 
receive feedback on their own, and change for the 
better. This mutual process was perceived as the 
supportive culture. It is harder to change the general 
culture of people or of a region, but it is easier to 
introduce these kinds of specific mechanisms through 
which people interact.
 We have to note that these connections for 
feedback and learning between entrepreneurs were not 
present in St. Louis several years ago. A director of a 
support organization used this analogy:
“The typical problem I saw with entrepreneurs 
five years ago was like this: ‘I do this business 
alone, and I don’t know other startups in 
town. I don’t know investors here, and there 
is only old money from big corporations in 
St. Louis, so I go to Silicon Valley to find an 
investor.’ Then, if you talked to investors, 
they would say: ‘I don’t find any prospective 
startups in St. Louis, and, in fact, there may 
not be any startups here, so I go to Silicon 
Valley to find companies [in which] to invest.’ 
So somehow, they might find each other in 
Silicon Valley, but not in St. Louis” (Brasunas, 
interview, December 10, 2012).
 These remarks are in sharp contrast to how our 
interviewees perceived the current supportive and 
friendly environment among the Arch Grants recipients 
and between support organizations and mentors. 
Often, culture is believed not to change quickly, but the 
specific ways in which people interact could, in fact, 
change in a matter of five years.
 We identified another important factor about 
the interactions among entrepreneurs and between 
entrepreneurs and support organizations. The locations 
of entrepreneurs and support organizations were 
extremely	concentrated,	as	seen	in	Figure	5.
 This figure depicts a rather boring map with two 
large concentration spots. The first is in downtown 
St. Louis, more specifically at 611 Olive Street,5  
where eight Arch Grants recipients and three support 
organizations resided. This location was a former 
department store building, and T-Rex, a space provider 
for entrepreneurship, occupied five floors. In addition 
to the eight Arch Grants recipients of 2013, seventy-
two other startup firms were operating in the space. 
The	second	is	between	downtown	and	Forest	Park,	
more	specifically	at	4041	Forest	Park	Avenue,	where	
three biotech firms and one support organization, 
BioGenerator, were located. The Arch Grants did not 
require, but encouraged, its recipients to be located in 
one of these places.
 We cannot make a pure causal argument, but we 
can at least observe that these physical co-locations 
substantially correlated with the interactions between 
firms. The Arch Grants required its recipients to 
relocate to the St. Louis area for at least one year. 
Three out of twenty recipients have not completely 
moved to St. Louis yet, and we identify them as having 
the least interaction with other recipients or support 
organizations. In contrast, all the most interactive 
companies were located either at the T-Rex location 
or	at	4041	Forest	Park	Avenue,	shown	through	larger	
circles	and	more	central	locations	in	Figures	1,	3,	and	4.
 We do not mean to argue that proximity 
sufficiently will create an interacting community of 
entrepreneurs. As Lichtenstein and Lyons (Lichtenstein 
and Lyons 2006, 2010) rightly emphasized, 
entrepreneurs even within the same incubator do 
not necessarily interact, but catalytic activities to 
connect them are crucial, often by a person who could 
5.	The	T-Rex	facility	moved	to	911	Washington	Avenue,	six	blocks	from	611	Olive	Street,	in	February	2014.
E x A M i n i n g  t h E  C o n n E C t i o n S  w i t h i n  t h E  S t A r t u p  E C o S y S t E M :  A  C A S E  S t u d y  o f  S t .  L o u i S   |   1 9
diagnose and assess different stages of development of 
entrepreneurs. With this case in St. Louis, there seemed 
to be the right ingredients: those entrepreneurs won 
the same prize and formed a cohort, and the support 
organizations also were located at the same facility, 
provided training, and organized catalytic activities to 
include the entrepreneurs.
 The interviews revealed that support organizations 
in the region provided somewhat overlapping, yet 
different, supports based on startups’ stages and 
functions. Analyzing support organizations’ responses 
to the open-ended interview question, “What 
kind of supports do you provide?,” we identified 
primary types of supports from each organization, 
Figure 5. map of arch grants recipients and support organizations
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categorized in Table 3. This table is not intended to 
be a comprehensive list of support types, but it still 
captures what each organization considers its primary 
supports, as well as a good amount of overlap between 
the organizations.
 We classify supports into two large categories: 
broad and functional. The broad supports are 
mentoring, finding people, connecting, and financial. 
The functional supports are more specific, including 
refining business models, practice pitching to investors 
and customers, due diligence, and space. Note 
that the “orthodox” kinds of support for economic 
development (financial and incubation space) were only 
two of the many functions these support organizations 
provided. Moreover, no organization provided money 
or space alone. The support organizations provided 
these traditional types of supports in conjunction with 
other supports.
 The previous studies on the entrepreneurship 
ecosystem discussed little about the content of support 
services, but rather treated it as a black box. At best, 
Feldman	(Feldman	2001)	identified	entrepreneurial	
support services as one element of the ecosystem 
and observed somewhat different types of supports. 
Our research contributes to establishing that there 
are a number of support types, of which our findings 
identified two handfuls, and that those support types 
do not fall into the clear-cut categories appearing 
in business school textbooks, such as finance, 
accounting, management, marketing, legal, and so 
on. The categories of supports provided by support 
organizations and identified by entrepreneurs were 
much more heterogeneous and subdivided. This finding 
underscores the important need for further research on 
this subject.
 Perhaps the most heterogeneous support was 
mentoring, which many support organizations 
identified as their primary service. We still have 
only limited knowledge about the exact content of 
mentoring. It could encompass other functions listed 
here as subcategories, such as refining the business 
model, finding the best-fit talent, managing cash flow, 
or achieving work-life balance. At least, we did find 
that those mentors worked with nascent entrepreneurs 
on a purely voluntary basis and did not receive 
monetary incentives for consultation. The mentors 
went through similar processes in their past and faced 
challenges, and they were willing to “give back” to 
the new generation through mentoring. In that sense, 
mentor-based support is contextually different from 
the presence of professional and support services that 
  
organizations
Broad functional
mentoring
People 
finding
connect-
ing
Financial
refine 
business 
model
Practice 
pitching
due  
diligence
Space /  
incuba-
tion
itEn x x x  x x  
Skandalaris Ctr.  x  x  
Biogenerator x x x x
innoVAtE/VMS x x   
Cap. innovators x x x x x x
StLVentureworks x  x
CEt x    x   x
table 3. types of Primary Supports Provided by Key Support organizations
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the cluster theory (Porter 1998) or global city literature 
(Sassen 2001) identified, and much more locally based 
and noncommercially oriented.
 While further research involving mentors is 
needed, interviewing only support organizations 
is insufficient, because these organizations do not 
necessarily mentor entrepreneurs, but instead introduce 
mentors to entrepreneurs. Interviewing entrepreneurs 
may not provide a complete perspective, either, 
because entrepreneurs may not disclose their most 
problematic issues. Mentoring is another understudied 
subject, although some recent research has started  
to indicate its presence and importance (Motoyama et 
al. 2013).
 One implication about types of supports and 
support organization is that multiple organizations 
provided somewhat similar supports, thus overlapping 
support functions at the regional level, and that 
such overlap helped entrepreneurs progress through 
different development stages. Earlier interview quotes 
revealed that entrepreneurs got financial support from 
multiple organizations at different times, which helped 
them to sustain their operations. As such, even within 
the same function, different support organizations had 
different	niches	and	training	methods.	For	instance,	
ITEN provided the Mock Angel Program, in which they 
trained entrepreneurs to present their business ideas to 
angel investors. That was contextually different from 
the pitching practice provided by Capital Innovators, 
whose primary target was venture capitalists and other 
institutional investors.
 We also observed that each organization had 
different assets, even within the same training function, 
and intended to provide complementary supports to 
companies. At the same time, the emergence of several 
support organizations in the past few years provided 
many new opportunities in the region and substantially 
changed the landscape of entrepreneurship: in addition 
to the inception of the Arch Grants in 2012, four of 
the seven support organizations discussed were created 
since 2011. Some organizations believed that there 
were redundancies across support systems. Indeed, 
there was debate about merging some organizations to 
create efficiencies and simplify things for entrepreneurs. 
During our four-month interview period in 2013, 
two support organizations named new executive 
directors with strategic intentions to reorganize the 
organizations’ missions, which could suggest constant 
reorganization of support organizations within a 
region. This further indicates that identifying and 
infilling missing types of supports is not sufficient 
for creating a healthy ecosystem. By definition, a 
system is a self-regulating mechanism with constant 
adjustments to its various parts. The entrepreneurship 
ecosystem is another kind of system, and much effort 
to analyze missing elements and fulfill them occurs 
through a mechanism similar to market evolution at 
the organizational level rather than the top-down 
method imposed by the public sector. If you inject a 
new element, it likely will cause adjustments to other 
elements and the ways different elements interact. 
What matters is how the ecosystem sustains such 
change.
 Through interviews, we further observed 
that entrepreneurs tried different support groups 
without formally joining the group’s programs, which 
clearly shows selective behavior by entrepreneurs 
and compatibility issues between given support 
organizations and given entrepreneurs. Support 
organizations may be tempted to recruit entrepreneurs 
formally to demonstrate their programs’ effectiveness, 
but they should not be proprietary in this sense and 
should have open boundaries. A delicate balance is 
needed, and certain conditions should be avoided, such 
as “free riding” and getting help without committing 
due diligence. Constant communication between 
support organizations seemed to help this aspect. 
Support organizations were aware of their supported 
entrepreneurs and had some knowledge about how, 
and how much, other organizations had helped 
them. Again, this interconnection between support 
organizations, the second level of connections, is 
essential.
 It is worth revisiting the role of universities in 
the entrepreneurship ecosystem. As mentioned, 
several local universities did play roles in supporting 
entrepreneurs,	but	only	in	specific	contexts.	First,	
only firms in the pharmaceutical or biotech sectors 
had involvement with universities, while firms in 
diScuSSion
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other sectors, like information technology and 
manufacturing, did not. There has been much 
debate about the role of the university as the engine 
of	regional	economic	development	(Fritsch	2002;	
Kitagawa 2004; Lawton Smith 2007), and those 
studies argued that the university influence was greater 
for high-tech or knowledge-intensive industries. 
Moreover, those studies treated “high-tech” sectors 
as relatively homogeneous, usually including biotech 
and pharmaceutical, information technology, and other 
specialized manufacturing, such as aerospace and 
precision machinery (see commonly used high-tech 
definitions (Saxenian 1999; Milken Institute 2011). 
We find significant heterogeneity within the high-tech 
sectors in this regard.
 Second, as discussed in the analysis section, the 
common pattern we found was that the founders were 
students or post-doctoral researchers at universities 
who applied the technologies of their specialties to 
commercial settings. In this sense, neither professors 
nor the technology transfer office was responsible for 
commercializing university-based technologies. Rather, 
transfer or commercialization took place through 
individuals and not through the standard linear model 
suggested in the literature, such as the Triple Helix 
model (Etzkowitz 2008; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 
2000). The creation of patents and licensing were not 
the observed method by which the university engaged 
with local entrepreneurship, and scientific knowledge 
did not trickle down by itself. Compared to faculty and 
university staff, students and post-doctoral researchers 
are more mobile, and they themselves transferred and 
applied their scientific knowledge.
One of the most active support organizations, 
the Skandalaris Center at Washington University 
in St. Louis, was by no measure a typical college 
entrepreneurship center housed within a business 
school or related to a technology transfer office. In 
fact, the Skandalaris Center is a special independent 
unit that reports directly to the university chancellor. 
Its endowment came from an entrepreneur, who 
specifically instructed its executive director to be non-
academic, and its strategy was way beyond providing 
standard entrepreneurship courses. The Skandalaris 
Center’s key functions are to motivate and prepare 
students for early-stage entrepreneurship and to 
connect students and local startup entrepreneurs 
by providing student résumés and allowing local 
entrepreneurs to serve on the judging panel for 
competitions. Thus, in this sense, the university role, 
such as business plan writing or accounting, was 
substantially different from providing a technology 
transfer office or offering courses through the business 
school. 
Finally,	we	note	that	all	senior-level	staff	at	support	
organizations had significant experience in the private 
sector or as entrepreneurs, and none had backgrounds 
in traditional economic development agencies. This fact 
has a significant policy implication. Because they had 
well-developed networks of their own and knew what 
kind of experiences each mentor had, these support 
organization staff could diagnose each entrepreneur’s 
specific entrepreneurial challenge and identify which 
mentor would be most helpful in that specific context, 
rather than simply assigning mentors based on 
generic categories, industrial sectors, and functions of 
business operation. Thus, knowing potential mentors 
at only a surface level is not sufficient, and providing a 
coordinator who would find local mentors, but wasn’t 
part of an existing entrepreneurial network, would 
unlikely be of help.
6. PoLicy 
imPLicationS6  
Our findings suggest the following strategies may 
be beneficial in developing a thriving ecosystem of 
entrepreneurship: 
connect entrepreneurs
•	 Entrepreneurs	learn	from	interacting	with	
other entrepreneurs. A strength of the St. 
6.	This	section	was	jointly	written	with	Jason	Wiens,	Kauffman	Foundation	policy	director.
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Louis startup ecosystem is the extent to 
which entrepreneurs are connected with 
others—both peers in similar industries and 
stages of growth, as well as more experienced 
entrepreneurs that can serve as mentors.
•	 Catalytic	events,	like	Startup	Weekend	or	
Code Until Dawn, that engage individuals 
in an entrepreneurial experience are more 
valuable for building and strengthening 
ties in a startup ecosystem than are purely 
networking events like cocktail parties.
collaborate with other 
entrepreneurial support 
organizations
•	 Anticipate	overlap	with	other	
organizations, yet retain a flexible 
posture. Multiple entrepreneurial support 
organizations in the St. Louis startup 
ecosystem offered similar types of support. 
While our research indicates that overlapping 
support helped entrepreneurs navigate and 
progress through different development 
stages, too much overlapping support should 
be avoided. 
•	 Communicate	and	coordinate	with	
other	support	organizations. Some 
level of overlapping support can mean 
constant tension and readjustment between 
organizations. While there typically is not, and 
should not be, a single decision-making entity 
to allocate support functions at the regional 
level, frequent communication with other 
organizations should help to identify areas in 
which support functions overlap and where 
gaps in service may exist. 
•	 Share	information	about	startups.	
Overlapping functions mean entrepreneurs 
may visit several support organizations 
to find the support needed. However, it 
should not mean an ecosystem in which 
entrepreneurs find the least painful advice 
among different organizations, commit to 
none, and ignore due diligence, failing to 
achieve what they promise to accomplish in a 
given time. To avoid such a situation, support 
organizations should be aware of the state of 
each company from perspectives of multiple 
support organizations. 
•	 Support organizations should cultivate 
the	list	of	experienced	entrepreneurs in 
the region and selectively connect new and 
experienced entrepreneurs. 
•	 Clarify	navigation	of	the	system	for	
entrepreneurs. Refer entrepreneurs to 
support organizations that can best meet 
their needs, resulting in the most efficient use 
of the region’s resources.
•	 Recruit	staff	with	entrepreneurial	
experience. In St. Louis, all senior-level staff 
at support organizations had significant 
experience in the private sector or as 
entrepreneurs, which facilitated accurate 
diagnosis of entrepreneurial problems. 
Moreover, senior-level staff were able to 
identify and connect entrepreneurs with 
specific mentors.
reinvent investments and 
incubators
•	 If	a	public	venture	fund	has	already	been	
established,	distribute	many	smaller	
prizes, instead of one large prize, so that a 
group of entrepreneurs can become a cohort 
and learn from one another.
Entrepreneurs learn from interacting with other entrepreneurs.
diScuSSion  |   PoLicy imPLicationS
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o Note that such cohort connections span 
industry boundaries, especially for seed 
and early-stage startups.
•	 If	incubators	already	exist,	reorganize	
them	to	connect	entrepreneurs	and	
enhance	peer-learning. Co-locate and 
integrate support organizations with 
incubators.
•	 Encourage	incubators	to	host	activity-
focused entrepreneurial events, as 
opposed to those with a purely “networking” 
purpose.
7. concLuding 
remarKS
 We were able to pay attention to the 
interconnections between entrepreneurs and support 
organizations and reach these findings because we 
asked questions focused on ground-level observations 
and entrepreneurs’ perspectives: What kind of inputs 
or	supports	did	you	receive	for	your	business?	From	
whom? In contrast, past ecosystem studies used 
the holistic approach often favored by geographers 
or economic development scholars: How is the 
regional entrepreneurship ecosystem structured? 
What are the regional assets of this area in terms of 
entrepreneurship? Those holistic questions about the 
region are fine from a research standpoint, but they 
are not necessarily compatible with how individual 
entrepreneurs behave in their daily operations and 
interactions. We believe that our approach, asking 
about past experiences and concrete examples from 
the entrepreneurs’ viewpoints, helped to identify more 
tangible connections within the ecosystem.
 The Arch Grants employed a rather unusual 
approach by distributing small prizes widely—as many 
as twenty. This was a sharp contrast to most other 
traditional business plan competitions established 
by the public sector, in which the first prize was a 
large sum, as much as $1 million, but awarded to 
no more than a few winners. Additionally, the Arch 
Grants streamlined carefully to integrate with local 
entrepreneurship assets, such as encouraging its 
recipients to operate in specific locations, which 
further enhanced their interactions, and connecting 
them to local key support organizations, such as ITEN, 
BioGenerator, and others.
It is hard to tell if this Arch Grants model will sustain, 
or if the supported companies will successfully grow. 
As of December 2013, half a year after the selection, 
most Arch Grants recipients seemed to be thriving, 
with 70 percent of them starting to generate revenue. 
It is even harder to tell how the startup ecosystem 
will evolve and integrate with the broader St. Louis 
entrepreneurship ecosystem over the coming years—
only time will tell. This is the dilemma that social 
science researchers with no pure experimental design 
opportunity have to face. However, we hope that 
some of the key findings and the proposed framework 
from this research can provide implications for further 
investigation of the entrepreneurial ecosystem and 
research methods.
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Holistic questions about the region are fine from a research standpoint, 
but they are not necessarily compatible with how individual entrepreneurs 
behave in their daily operations and interactions.
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organization interviewee name(s) date
itEn Jim Brasunas 8/1/2013
1 Million Cups francis Chmelir 8/1/2013
Skandalaris Center Ken harrington 8/6/2013
Biogenerator Eric gulve 10/1/2013
innoVAtE/VMS phyllis Ellison 10/29/2013
Capital innovators Matt Menietti 11/15/2013
StLVenture works travis Sheridan 12/9/2013
Arch grants ginger imster 2/13/2014
Appcropolis raul Sanchez 8/2/2013
Juristat drew winship 8/5/2013
trakBill Steven Marciniak 8/20/2013
immunophotonics Lu Alleruzzo 8/22/2013
genetix fusion Mohit patel 8/29/2013
MMBiosensing Amos danielli 9/6/2013
Sparo Labs A. Brimer, A. Cohen, w. dahl 9/19/2013
Eterno gen ron Bassuner 9/24/2013
triflare Andrea robertson 9/26/2013
rovertown Jeffry harrison 11/18/2013
u.S. drilling products Chuck Lee 12/2/2013
Adarza Biosystems rand henke 12/3/2013
Code red Michael palmer 12/3/2013
Lipospectrum Millind Sant 12/5/2013
Knowink Scott Leiendecker 12/13/2013
Adfreeq peter Meng 1/16/2014
2013 Cohort 10/1/2013 1/1/2014 4/1/2014 7/1/2014
Jobs 67 73 99 104
revenue $197,374 $957,265 $1,887,545 $2,862,700 
Capital $6,695,433 $7,443,433 $14,363,433 $17,907,251 
aPPendix 1: LiSt oF intervieweeS
aPPendix 2: PerFormance oF 2013 arch grantS reciPientS
Source: Arch grants (2014b).
aPPendiceS
E x A M i n i n g  t h E  C o n n E C t i o n S  w i t h i n  t h E  S t A r t u p  E C o S y S t E M :  A  C A S E  S t u d y  o f  S t .  L o u i S
4801 roCKhiLL roAd
KAnSAS City, MiSSouri 64110
816-932-1000 
www.kauffman.org
0914300fp
